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Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland:
Accountants' Liability to Third Parties
for Negligent Misrepresentation
For more than fifty years public accounting firms have provided a unique
financial service by performing annual audits on their clients' financial state-
ments. By rendering an independent, objective evaluation of the statements, the
auditor provides reasonable assurance to financial information users such as
lending institutions and investors that the financial statements fairly present the
financial position of the client.' But, in performing audits, public accountants
recognize that an "inherent divergence of interests [exists] between management
and third persons who will rely upon these statements. ' 2 While management
desires to maximize the profits reflected in the financial statements, third parties
seek to control risk by accurately evaluating a company's credit or investment
potential. This divergence of interests generates disagreement on the extent and
type of financial information that should be presented. The result is third-party
decision-makers demanding an impartial evaluation of the client's financial
statements.
Increasing complexity in financial transactions "dictate[s] that the general
public rely more heavily now than ever before on the work product of the profes-
sional accountant."'3 Increased competition for audit clients, however, has re-
sulted in price wars among the big accounting firms, and both commentators
and professionals assert that lower accounting fees create pressure on firms to
cut comers so that they may remain profitable on each job.4 Cutting comers
may result in a compromise of professional standards5 and may risk potential
lawsuits at a time when the exact scope of accountants' liability to third parties
remains unsettled.6
1. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS vol. B, Concept of Professional Ethics
No. 7, § 51 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1985) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
vol. B] (recognizing that the "public accountant should maintain his integrity and objectivity and...
be independent of those he serves"); ACCOUNTING STANDARDS vol. A, Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards No. 1, § 110 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1985) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS vol. A] ("The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the
independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they present the
financial position ... in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.").
2. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 347, 461 A.2d 138, 150 (1983).
3. Note, Negligent Misrepresentation and the Certified Public Accountant: An Overview of
Common Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 431, 431 (1984); see United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984) (public accountant's role is that of "Public
Watchdog"); ACCOUNTING STANDARDS Vol B, supra note 1, Concept of Professional Ethics No. 2,
§ 51 ("The reliance of the public . . . impose[s] particular obligations on certified public
accountants.").
4. See, e.g., Stevens, No More White Shoes, BUS. MONTH, April 1988, at 39, 40.
5. See id. at 41.
6. Jurisdictions currently apply one of four tests in evaluating the scope of accountants' liabil-
ity to third parties for negligent misrepresentation: (1) the traditional privity requirement, (2) a
balancing of factors approach, (3) the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard, and (4) the simple
negligence standard of reasonable foreseeability. See Gossman, An Examination of an Emerging
Tort Theory Expanding the Liability of Certified Public Accountants for Negligent Misrepresentation,
4 COOLEY L. REv. 301 (1987) (critical analysis of various theories of accountant liability); see also
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In 1931 the New York Court of Appeals held in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche 7 that a third party could recover for an accountant's negligence only if
she was considered the primary beneficiary of the contract between the auditor
and the client.8 More than fifty years later, most jurisdictions still require some
form of privity between the third party and the accountant before imposing lia-
bility for negligence. 9 The majority of courts recently addressing the issue have
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts formulation that extends the right of
recovery to third parties who are members of a foreseen class of financial state-
ment users.10 Nevertheless, a pure negligence formula that extends the cause of
action to all reasonably foreseeable users has gained increased acceptance from
both courts and legal commentators.I1
In Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Beckaert & Holland 12 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court addressed the legal sufficiency of third-party creditors'
claims of negligent misrepresentation by a public accounting firm that issued an
unqualified opinion on the financial statements of a client. The court followed
the modem trend and adopted the Restatement approach.
This Note examines the factors the court considered in evaluating the legal
sufficiency of the creditors' complaints regarding the essential elements of justifi-
able reliance and duty. The Note also addresses the importance of and problems
with establishing the additional element of causation. Finally, the Note reviews
the court's rationale for adopting the Restatement approach and concludes that
both legal reasoning and policy considerations support extending accountants'
liability to the more expansive reasonable foreseeability standard.
In Raritan River, Intercontinental Metals Corporation ("IMC") engaged
defendant, the public accounting firm of Cherry, Beckaert & Holland, to per-
form an audit of the company's financial statements for the fiscal years ending
September 30, 1980 and September 30, 1981.13 Defendant's audit report ex-
pressed an unqualified opinion that IMC's comparative financial statements
presented fairly the company's financial position as of September 30, 1981. The
Note, supra note 3, at 431-32 (noting that "[d]ue to this increased reliance [upon the auditor's re-
port], several jurisdictions have expanded accountants' liability for negligent economic injury to
third parties").
7. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
8. Courts and commentators refer to the doctrine as the "limited privity rule." See, e.g., Goss-
man, supra note 6, at 302. The Ultramares court did recognize a third party's right to recover from
an accountant for fraud in the absence of privity. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. See
infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text for facts and discussion of Ultramares.
9. Achampong, Common Law Liability of Accountants for Negligence to Non-Contractual Par.
ties: Recent Developments, 91 DICK. L. REV. 677, 677 (1985), reprinted in 37 DEF. L. REV. 203
(1988); see, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 554, 483 N.E.2d
110, 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 445 (1985); Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 970-71 (V.D. Ark.
1986); Briggs v. Sterner 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977); Gossman, supra note 6, at 302 (Re-
statement limits the scope of liability by retaining "as its basis the limits prescribed by contract
law").
I1. See Gossman, supra note 6, at 302-03; H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 355-56,
461 A.2d 138, 155-56 (1983). See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
reasonable foreseeability standard.
12. 322 N.C. 200, 367 S.E.2d 609 (1988).
13. Id. at 203, 367 S.E.2d at 611.
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audit report also included a statement that the defendant performed the audit in
accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). 14 IMC sub-
sequently went bankrupt.
The two plaintiffs, Raritan River Steel Company ("Raritan") and Sidbec-
Dosco, Inc. ("Sidbec"), consolidated their actions as creditors of IMC. Both
alleged that defendant's negligence in preparing the audit report resulted in an
overstatement of IMC's actual net worth in the financial statements. Raritan
claimed that it extended more than two million dollars credit on open account
for IMC's purchase of raw steel. Raritan obtained IMC's net worth figure from
a report published in Dun & Bradstreet, and the report cited defendant's audit
report as its source of information. Sidbec asserted that it obtained IMC's net
worth figure directly from the defendant's report, and it sought damages for the
loss of substantial unsecured credit extended to IMC in reliance on the report.
Before addressing the legal sufficiency of the two complaints, the supreme
court defined negligent misrepresentation as a tort that "occurs when a party
justifiably relies to his detriment on information prepared without reasonable
care by one who owed the relying party a duty of care."15 The court then con-
cluded that "a party cannot show justifiable reliance on information contained in
audited financial statements without showing that he relied upon the actual fi-
nancial statements to obtain this information." 16 Because Raritan pleaded reli-
ance on the Dun & Bradstreet report, the court dismissed its complaint. 17 Sidbec
pleaded reliance only on the actual audit report and financial statements and,
therefore, sufficiently pleaded the element of justifiable reliance.1 8
Next, the court addressed whether Sidbec's complaint adequately estab-
lished that defendant owed it a duty of care. The court noted four different tests
used by other jurisdictions in determining the scope of an accountant's liability
to third parties.19 The court rejected the limited privity rule of Ultramares as
unduly restrictive and rejected the more expansive negligence standard of rea-
sonable foreseeability as imposing "liability more expansive than an accountant
should be expected to bear."'20 The court adopted the Restatement formulation
and interpreted the standard to extend the right of recovery to any "person, or
one of a group of persons, whom the accountant or his client intends the infor-
14. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards concern the auditor's professional qualities and the
judgment exercised by him in the performance of his examination and his report. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) approved and adopted 10 standards with which
auditors must comply, and auditing procedures that auditors must perform before rendering an
opinion on the financial statements. See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS vol. A, supra note 1, Statements
of Auditing Standards Nos. I & 2, § 150.
15. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 612.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613.
18. Id. at 207-08, 367 S.E.2d at 613. The court's distinction is not between two sets of informa-
tion, but between two sources of information. Although Raritan and Sidbec presumably relied on
identical information, only Sidbec, which relied on the actual financial statements, sufficiently
pleaded justifiable reliance. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 6 for the enumeration of the four tests. See infra notes 24-50 and accompa-
nying text for the comparison and evaluation of the four tests.
20. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
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mation to benefit."'21 If the client holds the requisite intent, "then the account-
ant must know of his client's intent at the time the accountant audits or prepares
the information."'22
Sidbec's complaint alleged that defendant knew IMC would use the audited
financial statements to represent its financial condition and that third parties
would extend credit in reliance upon the statements. Applying the Restatement
test, the court concluded that Sidbec sufficiently alleged that defendant intended
or knew IMC intended such information to benefit third-party creditors. 2 3
The scope of accountants' liability for negligent misrepresentation was an
issue of first impression in North Carolina. The supreme court, therefore,
looked not only to the Restatement, but also to the extensive case law in other
jurisdictions for guidance in formulating a standard of liability.
The scope of accountants' liability to third parties was first addressed in the
landmark Ultramares case.24 In Ultramares plaintiff creditor, relying upon de-
fendant's report, suffered credit losses when the client company declared bank-
ruptcy.25 Defendant knew the client intended to use his report in obtaining
credit from banks, creditors, or sellers. Nevertheless, the court denied recovery
on the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim.
The Ultrarmares court rejected extending accountants' liability to third par-
ties because "if negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder ... may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class."'26 The court concluded that little justification existed
for imposing a duty that would subject a party to such consequences. 27
Although the assault on the Ultramares privity doctrine started in the late
1960s, 28 the requirement of privity survives as the majority rule.2 9 Jurisdictions
recently adopting the privity rule, however, have applied a contemporary formu-
lation of the privity standard articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 30 In Credit Alliance the court
21. Id. at 210, 367 S.E.2d at 614 (interpreting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1977)). See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text for the background and development of case
law concerning the Restatement.
22. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 210, 367 S.E.2d at 614.
23. Id. at 215-16, 367 S.E.2d at 618.
24. 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); see Note, supra note 3, at 436. By the beginning of the
twentieth century, "most American courts required privity for the recovery of damages for both
physical and economic injury allegedly caused by negligent performance of a contract." Note, supra
note 3, at 435 (emphasis added).
25. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442.
26. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. The plaintiff did prevail on its fraud claim. Some commenta-
tors argue that Justice Cardozo refused to extend liability for negligence to accountants either to
protect the "fledgling" accounting industry or because he believed that the plaintiff would prevail on
the fraud claim. See Achampong, supra note 9, at 205 n.14; Note, supra note 3, at 436-37 n.32.
27. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. The court also noted that such liability for
negligence would extend to "other callings" and create one negligence standard with regard to the
client and another standard, often stricter, with regard to the public. Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
28. See Gossman, supra note 6, at 302-03.
29. See Gossman, supra note 6, at 302 & n.6. For an enumeration of the four current ap-
proaches, see supra note 6.
30. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985); see, e.g., Toro Co. v. Krouse,
Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Indiana law) (insufficient evidence under
1462 [Vol. 67
1989] TORT LAW 1463
dismissed a third party's claim for credit losses allegedly resulting from reliance
upon a negligently prepared audit report. The court established a three-pronged
test for imposing liability which required that the accountant (1) know of the
"particular purpose" for which the plaintiff intends to use statements; (2) know
the specific identity of the plaintiff or plaintiffs; and (3) exhibit some conduct
"which evinces the accountants' understanding" of the plaintiff's reliance. 31
Although the court's wording differed from that used in the Ultramares primary
beneficiary test, the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint by finding that the
defendant's conduct failed "to demonstrate the existence of a relationship be-
tween the parties sufficiently approaching privity."
32
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Raritan River rejected the limited
privity rule and followed the modern trend in electing to adopt the Restatement
alternative for determining the scope of accountants' liability.33 The Restate-
ment extends the right of recovery for negligent misrepresentation to persons or
classes of persons (1) whom either the auditor intended to influence or knew that
his client intended to influence with the financial statements, and (2) who relied
upon such statements in a transaction that the accountant intended to influence
or knew his client intended to influence.34 Therefore, if the auditor knows the
client intends to use the financial statements to negotiate a bank loan but does
not know the specific bank, the auditor nevertheless is potentially liable for neg-
ligence to any bank with whom the client negotiates and obtains the loan.35
Courts have applied the Restatement formulation to a variety of third-party class
members. 36
In adopting the Restatement formulation, jurisdictions have justified the ex-
Credit Alliance test to show accountant's understanding of plaintiff's actual reliance); Robertson v.
White, 633 F. Supp. 1155, 1176-77 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (decided prior to Credit Alliance decision, but
nevertheless denied liability because defendant lacked actual knowledge regarding particular
plaintiff).
31. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
32. Id. at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
33. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617; see Achampong, supra note 9, at 211;
Gossman, supra note 6, at 302 n.6. But cf. Note, supra note 3, at 443 ("In the most recent decisions
concerning accountants' liability to third parties, courts have adopted a standard negligence theory
of recovery.").
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) (1977). The Restatement limits liability to
losses suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the
accountant] intends to supply the information or knows that the [client] intends to supply
it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that [the accountant] intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the [client] so intends ....
Id. The known limited group the auditor or client intends to influence is distinct from the "much
larger class who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to have access to the information" and
foreseeably rely on it. Id. § 552 comment h.
35. See id. § 552(a) comment h, illustrations 5-7. The Restatement extends the right of recovery
to the class actually foreseen by the accountant as well as to the person specifically foreseen. See
Note, supra note 3, at 440 & n.50.
36. See, e.g., Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 356 S.E.2d 198 (1987) (supplier of inven-
tory to client on credit not a member of class of whose reliance defendant was actually aware);
Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982) (account-
ant could specifically foresee limited partners' reliance on his report performed for the partnership).
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pansion of liability by pointing to the present status of the accounting industry.
In Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co. 3 7 the court noted that "the sophisti-
cation of modem accounting procedures and the accountant's central role in the
financing and investment industry are a far cry from the fledgling profession in
need of judicial protection that existed at the time of Ultramares.' '38 According
to the court, the Restatement approach "harmonize[s] the accountant's contem-
porary role and his potential liability."'39
The reasonable foreseeability or "pure" negligence formula represented a
third alternative available to North Carolina in establishing a rule of liability.
This standard imposes on the accountant liability for negligence to all those
whom he "should reasonably foresee as recipients from the company of the
statements."
40
At least one court has rejected the argument that extending accountants'
liability to all reasonably foreseeable users would result in financial ruin to the
accounting industry. In 1983 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in H. Rosenblum,
Inc. v. Adler,4 1 became the first court to adopt the reasonable foreseeability stan-
dard. The court concluded that "the extent of financial exposure has certain
built-in limits":42
The plaintiffs would have to establish that they received the audited
statements from the company pursuant to a proper company purpose,
that they, in accordance with that purpose, relied on the statements
and that the misstatements therein were due to the auditor's negligence
and were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage.4 3
The Rosenblum court also espoused two policy arguments supporting the
extension of liability. First, the court noted that extending liability shifted the
loss from the innocent third party to the negligent defendant. 44 Second, the
imposition of a duty to foreseeable users should cause "accounting firms to en-
gage in more thorough reviews." '45
Similarly, in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Co. 4 6 the California Court of Appeal adopted a standard negligence formula
after rejecting arguments that such an expansive test would impose an undue
burden on accountants because of their lack of control over the client's records
and the ultimate users.4 7 In International Mortgage plaintiff admitted that de-
37. 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982).
38. Id. at 903-04, 451 A.2d at 1311.
39. Id. at 904, 451 A.2d at 1312.
40. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983).
41. 93 N.J. 324,461 A.2d 138 (1983). The plaintiff in Rosenblum acquired stock in defendant's
client, a publicly traded corporation, after relying upon the defendant's unqualified audit report,
The auditors failed to detect the client's manipulation and falsification of accounting records, and
plaintiff's stock subsequently proved worthless. Id. at 329, 461 A.2d at 140.
42. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152.
45. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. The court further noted accountants' ability to satisfy their
financial obligations in the past and the availability of malpractice insurance. Id.
46. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986).
47. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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fendant neither knew of him at the time of the audit nor knew plaintiff would
rely or was relying on the statements. Nevertheless, the court refused to recog-
nize defendant's undue burden argument and stated:
The auditor is not guaranteeing the client's records and resulting finan-
cial statements are perfect; only that any errors which might exist
could not be detected by an audit conducted under GAAS and GAAP.
Thus, the auditor's degree of control over the client's records is unim-
portant; the auditor need only control his or her abilities to apply
GAAS and GAAP to a given audit situation.4 8
In addressing the auditor's lack of control over the ultimate users, the court held
that the auditor's liability extends "only to those third parties who reasonably
and foreseeably rely on the audited statements."4 9
In Raritan River the North Carolina Supreme Court had a choice of four
standards for assessing an accountant's duty: the privity rule, the Restatement
r~ile, the balancing of factors approach, and the reasonable foreseeability stan-
dard. Before adopting a standard, however, the court established the require-
ments for proving the element of justifiable reliance.
The court stated that to prove justifiable reliance, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that he relied on information in the "actual financial statements." 50 The
court cited as authority for its premise the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in Rosenblum.5 1 In Rosenblum the court, after adopting the expansive foresee-
able users standard for determining the scope of liability, limited its holding by
declaring that "foreseeable users... [must] receive the audited statementsfrom
the business entity for a proper business purpose to influence a business decision of
the user."'52
In its complaint Raritan pleaded reliance on information contained in a
Dun & Bradstreet credit report. Although Dun & Bradstreet cited defendant's
audit report as its source of information, the supreme court dismissed the claim
because it failed to allege reliance on the actual audit report. The court noted
that no other court had permitted a plaintiff to prevail "without demonstrating
that they relied upon the accountant's actual audit opinion."'53 In addition, the
court implicitly incorporated Rosenblum's additional requirement that the plain-
tiff receive the audit report from the client or accountant.54
48. Id. at 818, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
49. Id. at 818, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
50. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 612 (emphasis added).
51. Id. (citing H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352-53, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983)).
52. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153 (emphasis added). The New Jersey court then
concluded that "an institutional investor or portfolio manager who does not obtain the audited state-
ments from the company would not come within the stated principle." Id. at 352-53, 461 A.2d at
153.
53. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 613.
54. Id. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 612-13. Although the court cited Rosenblum with favor, whether
such citation constitutes an express adoption is not completely certain. The Raritan River court did
not strictly hold that the plaintiff must have received the report from the client or accountant, but
only that it must have relied on the actual audited financial statements. However, the court did not
address any discrepancies that might have existed between the Dun & Bradstreet report and the audit
report. Therefore, reliance on the actual audit report is required probably not to bar plaintiffs who
1989] TORT LAW 1465
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The court expressly stated two reasons for requiring reliance on the actual
audit report. First, the audit opinion expresses the accuracy of the client's finan-
cial position "at a given period of time." 55 Second, the financial statements "are
the representations of management, [and] not the auditor."'5 6 At first glance,
these two considerations do not seem to provide a sound basis for the court's
requirement of reliance on the actual audit report. Presumably, if precisely the
same information exists in both the Dun & Bradstreet report and the audit state-
ments, then no disparity in the information conveyed to the users will exist be-
cause the publication has altered neither the opinion's accuracy nor the date or
content of the audit report.
In fact, however, the court's rationale is reasonable. Because of the unique
nature of an auditor's opinion-valuable for a limited time and based upon rep-
resentations other than his own-the auditor needs some control over distribu-
tion of the audited information. Therefore, the court implied a requirement that
the user receive the audit report from the client or accountant to provide the
auditor with a mechanism for limiting the scope of his liability by controlling the
distribution of his audit report.57
A third basis for the court's requirement of reliance on the actual audited
financial statements is the indivisible nature of the audit report. The court
stated, "Isolated statements in the report, particularly the net worth figure, do
not meaningfully stand alone; rather, they are interdependent and can be fully
understood and justifiably relied on only when considered in the context of the
entire report .... ,,58 The court recognized that an auditor expresses an opinion
on the financial statements taken as a whole, and not on the individual parts. 59
Furthermore, an auditor cannot control which audited information a financial
information supplier selects to reproduce for its subscribers. Thus, to permit a
third party to recover for losses resulting from reliance on less than the full audit
report exposes the accountant to liability greater than his undertaking. 60
Theoretically, the plaintiff also must prove causation by demonstrating that
reliance on specific inaccurate data, as opposed to the entire financial report,
rely on inaccurate reproductions, but plaintiffs who receive the information from a source other than
the client or accountant.
55. Id. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. The engagement letter between the auditor and
the client sets out the nature, extent, and timing of the auditor's services. The auditor and client also
may establish the number of audit report copies and identify any third party recipients. Thus, by
controlling the number of parties receiving the audited statements, the auditor can control the poten-
tial number of claimants. In addition, the auditor can control the timing of statement distribution
and thereby exercise limited control over the time frame in which parties receive the information.
58. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613. The court stated that the "entire report"
consists of not only the financial statements themselves, but also "any explanatory footnotes in-
cluded in the statements." Id.
59. See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS vol. A, supra note 1, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
I, § 504 (fourth reporting standard).
60. Even if the audit report and the published information are identical, the other considera-
tions make reliance unjustified. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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caused his damages.61 Because Raritan River only reached the pleading stage,
the court never addressed the causation issue other than to acknowledge that
plaintiff alleged errors in the financial statements and losses in reliance upon
such statements. 62 One commentator has noted that "an examination of past
audit cases reveals that more often than not the auditors were held [liable] for
the entire amount of plaintiff's loss," because the court never attempted to ap-
portion damages based on causation. 63 Whether North Carolina will follow this
trend remains to be determined. However, if courts continue to permit a plaintiff
to establish detrimental reliance (i.e., causation) merely by proving errors in the
statements and losses from reliance on those statements-rather than reliance on
the specific errors in the statements-then the lack of detrimental reliance will
cease to exist as a valid defense.64
Establishing causation requires not only proving detrimental reliance on the
audit report, but also proving that the auditor's errors and omissions were mate-
rial. If courts fail to assess the materiality of the auditor's misstatements, then
any insignificant errors incapable of adversely influencing a user's decision could
serve as a foundation for accountants' liability.65 Presumably, however, because
courts require a misstatement of a material fact for fraud claims, the courts like-
wise will require material misstatements for negligence claims.
The second issue created by the Raritan River court's definition of negligent
misrepresentation regarded to which third parties the auditor's duty extended.
The court first discussed and evaluated other jurisdictions' support and criticism
for each alternative.
The court declined to adopt the longstanding Ultramares approach, declar-
ing it "unduly restrictive" in light of the "central role independent accountants
play in the financial world."' 66 The court recognized that audited information
increasingly serves as the financial decision-making tool for investors and lend-
ers. 67 Due to the "heavy public reliance on audited information," the Ul-
tramares rule undesirably discriminated against otherwise deserving plaintiffs
not in "privity or near-privity" with the auditor.68
61. See Gossman, supra note 6, at 323 (plaintiff must prove reliance on inaccurate data caused
his losses).
62. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 203, 367 S.E.2d at 611.
63. Gossman, supra note 6, at 323 ("such a result is neither fair nor consistent with legal
principles").
64. See id.
65. In Ultramares, Cardozo's apprehension in abrogating the privity requirement was that "a
thoughtless slip or blunder" could create liability. 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
66. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
67. Id. The Raritan River court's rejection of the Ultramares approach accords with the major-
ity of recent decisions in other jurisdictions. See Gossman, supra note 6, at 302 n.6.
68. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615. In addition to the "heavy public reli-
ance" rationale, the court apparently considered most persuasive other courts' arguments that an
alternative standard best serves to encourage the accountants to refrain from performing negligent
audits at the expense of innocent parties. See, eg., H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 339,
461 A.2d 138, 145 (1983); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 134, 356 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1987).
But see Gossman, supra note 6, at 320-21 ("The assertion that an accountant's duty to the public is
such as to give rise to liability to the general public is neither logical nor founded on sound legal
principles."); Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is -Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL
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The rejection of the "near-privity" rule not only follows the modem trend,
but is legally sound. The current Ultramares standard extends liability only to
the specifically foreseen plaintiff.69 For example, an auditor might learn that his
client intends to use the audit report to procure two separate loans, one from
Bank X and one from an anonymous bank. Although extending the auditor's
liability to both banks would result in no additional burden to perform his audit
with reasonable care, the auditor nonetheless would remain liable for negligent
misrepresentation under the "near-privity" rule only to the specifically foreseen
Bank X.70 However, both the Restatement rule and the reasonable foreseeability
standard would impose liability on the auditor to both banks.
With little discussion, the Raritan River court also rejected the Biakanja v.
Irving71 balancing test, which the North Carolina Court of Appeals had adopted
as the appropriate standard. The court considered the "moral blame" and "pol-
icy of preventing future harm" factors incapable of "precise application."'72 In
addition, the court noted that the factors added little to the "assessment of
whether a defendant violated a particular duty of care."'73 Finally, the court
found the balancing test to approximate the "reasonable foreseeability" test, and
for reasons stated below, the court refused to adopt such an expansive
standard.74
The Raritan River court concluded that the Restatement standard most ef-
fectively balanced "the need to hold accountants to a standard that accounts for
their contemporary role in the financial world with the need to protect them
from liability that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking. '75
In adopting the Restatement standard, the court explained its rejection of the
"reasonable foreseeability" test. The court examined the analogy made by other
jurisdictions between negligent misrepresentation claims and products liability
claims.76 The court rejected the reasonable foreseeability jurisdictions' conclu-
STUD. 295, 300 (1988) (arguing that third parties who desire increased reliability should contract
with the auditor for it, because the assertion that increased liability alone provides an incentive for
the auditor to exercise greater care is at best dubious).
69. Seisupra text accompanying notes 29-32.
70. See AccoUNTING STANDARDS vol. A, supra note 1, Statement of Auditing Standards
§ 312; infra notes 101-02.
71. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). The Biakanja balancing of factors represents a fourth
approach to assessing liability to third parties for negligent misrepresentation, However, this ap.
proach has received little recognition by courts in assessing accountants' liability. Biakanja involved
extending a notary public's liability for negligence to a third party based upon balancing factors such
as the "extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, [and] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury ... ." Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
Only one court, the Missouri Court of Appeals in 1973, has applied this approach to the auditors'
situation. See Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co. 493 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
Ironically, even the California courts have refused to use the Biakanja test in assessing accountants'
liability. E.g., International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (1986).
72. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617.
73. Id.
74. Id; see infra text accompanying notes 75-94.
75. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617.
76. Id. at 212, 367 S.E.2d at 615-16. The distinction between claims involving economic injury
and claims involving physical injury intensified after the New York Court of Appeals' holding that a
third party may recover for physical injury resulting from the negligence of a manufacturer not in
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sion that public policy does not justify disparate treatment between the two
classes of claimants. 7 7 On the contrary, the court concluded that the analogy
highlighted three "significant differences" "[b]etween the production and distri-
bution of an accountant's audit report and the design and manufacture of a
product" that justified disparate treatement.78
The first "significant difference" concerned the accountant's inability to
control the distribution of his report.7 9 This lack of distribution control meant
the accountant lacked control over his "exposure to liability." 80 Earlier in its
opinion, however, the court asserted that a deserving plaintiff must rely on the
actual audited statements, and thus implied that the plaintiff must receive those
statements from the client or accountant.8 1 These restrictions raise doubts about
the soundness of the court's "lack of distribution control" argument. In addi-
tion, as the reasonable foreseeability jurisdictions argue, the "lack of control
over ultimate users is not prejudicial," because the auditor's liability extends
only to reasonably foreseeable users.8 2 Thus, courts in these jurisdictions refuse
to distinguish between negligent misrepresentation claims against accountants
and manufacturers based on the argument that accountants lack control of prod-
uct distribution.
A second difference between manufacturers and accountants expressed by
the court was the auditor's lack of control over the client's records and thus his
"lack of control over some of the contents of the statements he assesses."'8 3 A
legitimate concern does exist that innocent or fraudulent misrepresentations by
the client to the auditor ultimately may reach the financial statements and sub-
ject the accountant to liability.84 Several courts, however, have correctly noted
privity with him. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389-90, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054
(1916); see also Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931) (third
party not in privity with defendant denied recovery for economic injury). But see Glanzer v. Shep-
ard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922) (permitting recovery for economic injury suffered
by purchaser as a result of defendant's negligence in performing on a contract with the seller). Jus-
tice Cardozo wrote all three opinions for the New York court.
77. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 212, 367 S.E.2d at 615-16 (citing H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,
93 N.J. 324, 341, 461 A.2d 138, 147 (1983)).
78. Id. at 212, 367 S.E.2d at 616.
79. Id. Manufacturers and designers are relatively more capable of controlling the means by
which their products enter the stream of commerce. Id.
80. Id. The court was apparently concerned over the potentially large number of claims result-
ing from any one particular negligent misrepresentation.
81. See supra notes 53, 56-60 and accompanying text. At least one commentator suggests that
such requirements will facilitate distribution control because the auditor, before rendering his serv-
ices, could agree with the client on a particular number of copies for distribution or a fixed group of
persons receiving copies. See Gossman, supra note 6, at 322.
82. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 818,
223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225-26 (1986) (emphasis added). But see Gossman, supra note 6, at 322 (ques-
tioning whether the foreseeability standard represents any practical restraint on liability, since al-
most anyone could be foreseen as a "potential reliant person"). One might argue that third parties
who fail to comprehend the nature of an audit report do not constitute reasonably foreseeable users.
To hold a defendant liable to "misusers" would impose a standard approaching strict liability.
83. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 212-13, 367 S.E.2d at 616.
84. One collateral issue not present in Raritan River is the effect of criminal conduct on the part
of the client. At least one court has concluded that criminal client conduct subsequent to the audi-
tor's completion of his field work constitutes an intervening cause exonerating the auditor from
liability. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 324 (Miss. 1987);
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that the auditor does not guarantee that the financial statements are perfect.85
These courts have concluded that the auditor must only perform the audit in
accordance with GAAS and thereby preclude responsibility for errors which
proper procedures fail to detect.86 If compliance with GAAS establishes the
proper standard of care for accountants, then the auditor's lack of control over
the client's records does not materially interfere with performance of the audit in
accordance with such standards.
The court found a third "significant difference" between manufacturers'
and accountants' respective expectations concerning the use of their product.
The court stated that manufacturers desire unknown consumers to use their
product; thus, their expectations encompass an undertaking that may subject
them to liability to an indefinite class of anonymous users. Accountants, on the
other hand, receive no benefit from client distribution of their reports, and, un-
like manufacturers, their expectations do not include unidentified users with un-
identified purposes.8 7 As previously noted, however, the public relies
extensively or solely on the auditor's report in making financial decisions.88 In
fact, this longstanding and increasing third-party reliance on the auditor's in-
dependent, objective evaluations generates demand for his product.8 9
The court's differentiation between manufacturers and accountants has
merit because the auditor is unaware of most "foreseeable" users' identities and,
therefore, lacks the ability to adopt appropriate risk allocation methods. 90 The
foreseeability jurisdictions, which limit justifiable reliance to foreseeable users
with a "proper business purpose," apparently consider that this restriction pro-
vides auditors with the information needed for minimizing risk. 91
The court concluded its assault on the "reasonable foreseeability" standard
by expressing concern over the "potential for inordinate liability."192 The New
see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 344, 461 A.2d 138, 148 (1983) (auditor required
to detect illegal or improper acts only if the exercise of "normal professional skill and care" would
uncover them).
85. See, eg., International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Commer-
cial Union, 514 So. 2d at 322. See also ACCOUNTING STANDARDS vol. A, supra note 1, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 1, § 110 (auditor expresses opinion only as to fairness with which clients
present their financial position).
86. See, eg., International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225. Because
the Raritan River case proceeded only to the pleading stage, whether North Carolina will construe
compliance with GAAS as the standard of care benchmark remains unresolved. See infra note 104
and accompanying text.
87. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 213, 367 S.E.2d at 616.
88. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
89. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 345.46, 461 A.2d 138, 149-50 (1983).
90. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 213, 367 S.E.2d at 616. The court, in fairness to accountants,
believed auditors should not be held liable when they are "unaware of the use to which their opin-
ions will be put." Id. The court failed, however, to consider whether the Restatement standard
discourages auditors from probing clients about intended uses of the statements at the risk of in-
creasing their own liability, while nevertheless receiving benefits like increased demand as a result of
such undisclosed uses. Furthermore, this disincentive to inquire about the identities and uses of third
parties is a detriment to all parties concerned, because knowledge of the identities and uses of third
parties allows the auditor more knowledgeably to plan and focus performance of audit procedures
required to comply with GAAS.
91. See, e-g., Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 151.
92. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617. Although the court rejected the Ul-
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Jersey Supreme Court's response has been that "certain built-in limits" assure
that the extent of financial exposure remains in proportion to the accountant's
undertaking. 9 3 At least one commentator questions whether in practice these
"limitations" exist. 94 In any event, courts could alleviate the potential risk of
inordinate liability by requiring the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence at trial
on each essential element.
95
The North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that application of the
Restatement has been less than uniform.9 6 The court cohcluded that the audi-
tor's knowledge of the client's intended use, regardless of the source of his
knowledge, is sufficient for liability. 97 Because Sidbec pleaded that defendant
knew its client would use the statements to procure credit, the court considered
plaintiff among the foreseen class of lenders.
Since the promulgation of the Restatement, few courts have reached the
issue of what standard of care, as opposed to what duty of care, should be used
in evaluating an auditor's performance. The auditor undertakes to perform an
audit in accordance with GAAS and to present the financial statements in ac-
cordance with GAAP. The issue remains, however, whether compliance with
these professional standards should constitute reasonable care.
At least one federal district court answered this question in the negative.98
In an action under the Securities Exchange Act, the court stated that the issue
was "whether the report fairly presents the true financial position of [the client]
... to the untutored eye of an ordinary investor."99
In Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissionerc°° the United States Supreme
Court held that compliance with GAAP did not meet the requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code and Regulations, which require compliance with tax ac-
counting procedures.10 1 The import of these two cases for accountants is that,
tramares privity approach, the court cited Cardozo's statement in support of the narrow privity rule
that imposing liability for negligence upon accountants will result in "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Id. (citing Ultramares at 179-80, 174
N.E. at 444).
93. See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. For an enumeration of the limitations, see
supra text accompanying note 42.
94. See Gossman, supra note 6, at 321-25 (implying that courts avoid addressing the causation
or contributory negligence issues and that the foreseeability limitations are illusory).
95. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
96. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 215, 367 S.E.2d at 618. The court noted that some jurisdictions
will extend liability only if the "client specifically mentions a person or class of persons." Id.
97. Id. Thus, the foreseen class includes third parties whose reliance the auditor discovers from
a source other than his client.
98. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
99. Id. (emphasis added) (stating compliance with GAAP as the proper way to report financial
transactions "misses the point").
100. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
101. Id. at 540. The Court held that compliance with GAAP did not alleviate the duty to com-
ply with federal regulations, but never expressed or implied that compliance with GAAP fails to
create a presumption of due care for financial reporting purposes. Nevertheless, at least one com-
mentator says the Thor holding leaves professionals with no assurance that compliance with profes-
sional standards will protect them from liability for negligence. See Note, Thor Power Tool Co. v.
C.I.R. Further Erodes CPA. 's Defense of Observing Professional Standards, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 87, 96
(1981).
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although they do not deal directly with the standard of care required of account-
ants, they clearly reject GAAP as a conclusive measure of an accountant's per-
formance. Other courts may look to these cases as authority for requiring a
standard of care higher than GAAP in negligent misrepresentation cases.
Neither case, however, should control a court's formulation of the auditor's
common-law standard of care for negligance because auditors undertake only to
perform an audit in compliance with GAAS.
The North Carolina Supreme Court correctly observed that the contempo-
rary role of the accountant significantly differs from his role at the time of
Ultramares.1 0 2 Although the court extended liability in proportion to the profes-
sion's growth and increased importance to the public, the court also recognized
that some limitation on liability is appropriate. Given the court's narrow scope
of inquiry on the issues of detrimental reliance and causation, its adoption of the
Restatement rule to protect accountants from exposure to inordinate liability is
understandable. Both law and policy, however, support extending accountants'
liability to all reasonably foreseeable third-party users.
Concerns over the potential for massive accountant liability may be allevi-
ated by at least three factors. First, a requirement that plaintiffs produce suffi-
cient evidence to establish justifiable reliance and causation should severely limit
the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover.10 3 Second, courts can prohibit recovery
by plaintiffs who fail to comprehend the true nature of the audit report. These
"misusers" should fall within neither the reasonably foreseeable user category
nor the justifiable reliance group. By affording such parties an opportunity to
recover, courts improperly permit a third party's misguided perception of the
audit report to extend the accountant's liability beyond his actual undertaking.
Third, compliance with the professional standards (i.e., GAAS and GAAP)
should, at a minimum, raise a rebuttable presumption that the auditor exercised
due care. 1° 4 In rare circumstances, because of the volatile nature of financial
transactions and the inability of the AICPA to anticipate all future regulatory
requirements, an auditor's compliance with established standards might not con-
stitute reasonable care. Courts should, however, consider such occurrences as
the exception, not the rule, and avoid invading the standard-setting function that
accounting committees can more ably perform.
Finally, policy-based considerations support recovery by foreseeable third
102. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
103. For example, by requiring a proper showing at trial of justifiable reliance and causation,
courts can reduce the potential for an indeterminate duration of liability. A plaintiff who offers
proof of justifiable reliance on an audit report rendered several years earlier should not prevail,
because changing financial conditions materially affect the reasonableness of using such information
for present-day decisions. Likewise, losses that occur several years subsequent to reliance on an
erroneous audit report may indicate lack of causation by the report; changing consumer interests,
technological advancements, or poor management planning might have adversely affected the cli-
ent's financial condition. Finally, state legislatures can develop statutes of limitation if necessary,
while adopting a "discovery" rule similar to that used in medical malpractice to avoid the "door-
closing" effect on meritorious claims. Cf Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974)
(medical malpractice case applying "discovery" rule).
104. If courts define due care to require performance of procedures not required under GAAS
and GAAP, then in most instances the court has unjustly increased the auditor's actual undertaking.
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parties. Shifting responsibility for losses from the innocent third party to the
negligent auditor justifies extending the right of recovery to foreseeable third
parties.10 5 The nature and extent of audit procedures necessary to comply with
GAAS do not depend upon the potential number of users.10 6 Thus, while courts
dispute whether shifting responsibility will cause auditors to exercise greater dil-
igence, the burden on the auditor to exercise due care does not increase.107
In view of the increased public reliance on audited information, the modem
trend to shift responsibility to the accountant is both logical and fair. In their
attempt to justify retaining some restrictions on the scope of accountants' liabil-
ity, however, courts should not adopt the Restatement rule as a compromise for
their unwillingness to require plaintiffs to prove elements such as detrimental
reliance and failure to exercise reasonable care. Furthermore, while increasing
the number of potential audit report users would not increase the auditor's bur-
den of complying with GAAS, discovering third parties' identities would better
enable the auditor to minimize risk and efficiently plan and focus performance of
audit procedures. North Carolina should adopt the reasonable foreseeability
standard, which would encourage auditors to make inquiries concerning third
parties' identities and uses. The Restatement rule adopted by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Raritan River provides a disincentive for auditors to ask
questions about potential users, because such inquiry would extend the auditor's
liability by making such users members of a foreseen class.
G. STEPHEN DIAB
105. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 321-22 (Miss. 1987).
106. Auditors develop the nature and extent of audit procedures when performing an audit in
accordance with GAAS based upon the size of the client and audit risk. Neither of the factors
consists of any inquiry into the number of potential reliants. See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS vol. A,
supra note 1, Statement on Auditing Standards § 312.
107. Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Judge Learned
Hand's duty formulation balances the increased burden of exercising due care against the probability
and the gravity of harm.). Arguably, the burden on the auditor to exercise reasonable care is not
enlarged by an increase in the number of potential users, because the auditor must perform the audit
in accordance with GAAS for a party who always remains foreseen or foreseeable-the client.
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